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Abstract
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather
than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear
inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. However, it may be that simple models
do not capture several complexities of real-life settings. This article surveys recent theories that
extend traditional frameworks to incorporate these dimensions, and show that the above features
can be fully consistent with e¢ ciency. For example, optimal contracting theories can explain
the recent rapid increase in pay, the low level of incentives and their negative scaling with rm
size, pay-for-luck, the widespread use of options (as opposed to stock), severance pay and debt
compensation, and the insensitivity of incentives to risk.
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1. Introduction
CEO compensation is a controversial topic. In theory, pay packages should be designed by boards
to maximize value on behalf of shareholders. Contracts should therefore attract talented CEOs and
incentivize them to exert e¤ort, exploit growth opportunities, and reject wasteful projects, while
minimizing the cost of doing so. However, many empirical facts may appear inconsistent with optimal
contracting. For example, CEO pay in the U.S. has risen substantially in recent years, vastly outpacing
the rise in average wages. Moreover, CEO wealth appears to bear little relation to rm performance,
especially in large rms. Other seemingly ine¢ cient features include severance packages for failed
CEOs, rewarding CEOs for luck, and the high level of stock options compared to shares.
In a thought-provoking book, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that these facts are evidence that
compensation is decided by executives themselves, who seek to maximize their own wealth rather than
shareholder value. This view has proven highly inuential and sparked calls for policy intervention
(see, e.g., Kandel (2009) for proposals to improve the e¢ ciency of pay) and major reforms in corporate
governance more generally to increase shareholder power. It has also provided the motivation for new
theories which model compensation as being set by the CEO rather than shareholders, such as Kuhnen
and Zwiebel (2007) and Ruiz-Verdú (2008).1 However, Bebchuk and Frieds interpretation of the
evidence has been challenged on both conceptual and empirical grounds. As an example of the former,
Holmstrom (2005) points out that the rise in pay is only a recent phenomenon that has coincided
with a decrease in CEO power resulting from greater institutional pressure. He also argues that
compensation does not appear to be vastly di¤erent between family rms and dispersed corporations,
even though managerial power varies signicantly across the two settings. As an example of the
latter, Core, Guay and Thomas (2005) argue that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to rm performance
is substantially higher than the levels documented by Bebchuk and Fried, when taking into account
the CEOs previously granted stock and options rather than just changes in annual salary.2
This article contributes to the above debate by challenging the rent extraction view on theoretical
grounds. While the features highlighted by Bebchuk and Fried are inconsistent with the predictions
of simple models, it may be that there are many complex aspects of the employment relationship not
captured by traditional theories. A contract that accounts for these important dimensions may indeed
contain the above aspects. We survey a number of recent models in the above spirit. Given space
constraints, it is far from comprehensive and omits many important contributions to the eld. In
particular, it contains predominantly working papers and newly published papers in order to capture
the most recent research, at the expense of many classics.
We start in Section 2 by reviewing recent theories that seek to justify the apparently high level
of pay, its low sensitivity to rm performance, and its high sensitivity to luck. Section 3 tackles the
1In both papers, the CEO is able to hide compensation from shareholders. The trade-o¤ is that excessive hidden
compensation reduces reported prots and may lead to shareholder intervention.
2Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) also provide additional surveys and interpretations of the
empirical evidence from Bebchuk and Fried (2004).
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composition of compensation contracts, such as the mix of stock, options and salary, and the use of
severance pay and debt-like instruments. Section 4 addresses further cross-sectional determinants of
pay, such as industry dynamics, as well as highlighting parameters that contracts need not depend
upon. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Level and Sensitivity of Pay
2.1. The Level of Pay
The sheer magnitude of CEO pay is perhaps the most commonly cited statistic in support of the rent
extraction view. For example, the 250th best-paid U.S. CEO earned $8.3 million in 2004. This is
substantially higher than in other countries and represents a six-fold increase since 1980.
To understand these trends, Gabaix and Landier (2008) analyze a simple equilibrium model of
CEO pay. CEOs have di¤erent talents and are matched to rms in a competitive assignment model.
The model contains no incentive problem, and so CEOs are paid for their talent, not as compensation
for risk or e¤ort. Since talent has greatest e¤ect in bigger rms, in market equilibrium the most skilled
CEOs are employed by the largest companies, and so a CEOs pay is increasing in the size of his rm.
It is also increasing in aggregate rm size, since if companies become larger across the economy, the
returns to employing talented managers rise and this competition bids up wages. They show that the
six-fold increase in U.S. CEO pay since 1980 can be attributed to the simultaneous growth in rm
size.
Rising competition for managerial talent may stem from other factors in addition to rm growth.
Frydman (2005) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) provide theory and evidence documenting the in-
creasing importance of transferable rather than rm-specic human capital for the CEOs job, which
directly increases pay through expanding CEOsoutside options. Moreover, Giannetti (2008) docu-
ments an additional, more subtle channel. An increase in the possibility of job-switching (which may
result from greater transferability of skills) induces CEOs to select short-term projects that increase
their external marketability, rather than e¢ cient long-term projects. To prevent such behavior, share-
holders must promise the manager a greater share of the prots from a long-term project, which raises
expected compensation.3 Cao and Wang (2008) present a market equilibrium model where rms and
CEOs search for optimal matches. They show both theoretically and empirically that the growing
performance of the macro-economy and rm specic factors simultaneously generate the rise in CEO
pay and rm size. Marin and Verdier (2004) argue that an increase in international trade has led to
foreign rms entering the war for managerial talent, which in turn puts upward pressure on pay.
Conversely, the increase in rm size can augment pay levels through channels unrelated to com-
petition for talent. Gayle and Miller (forthcoming) show theoretically and empirically that larger
3Since xed salaries cannot fall below zero owing to limited liability, shareholders cannot accompany the increased
prot share with a reduction in cash to keep total pay constant.
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rms are more complex to manage, and so CEOs require greater pay as compensation. In addition,
agency problems are greater in large rms, necessitating higher equity incentives and thus a salary
increase as a premium for bearing risk. A number of other papers also point to the changing nature
of the employment relationship. Hermalin (2005) argues that tighter corporate governance increases
both the level of e¤ort that the CEO must exert and the risk of dismissal, and so managers demand
greater pay as compensation. In Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), CEOs specialize in knowledge
acquisition and problem solving, leaving routine production tasks to lower-level employees. Recent
increases in communication technologies (e.g. e-mail) allow even greater specialization, since CEOs
can communicate their knowledge to subordinates to be used in production. This greater focus on
skilled tasks also leads to an increase in CEO pay.
A quite separate explanation is o¤ered by Hayes and Schaefer (forthcoming). They show that, if
the market forms inferences about the CEOs productivity from his salary, rms may wish to inate
their pay to improve outsidersperceptions and temporarily boost the stock price. This leads to a
Lake Wobegon E¤ectall rms wish to pay their CEO above the market average, thus increasing
aggregate pay levels over time.
2.2. Sensitivity to Own-Firm Performance
A second major controversy is the apparent insensitivity of CEO wealth to performance. Jensen and
Murphy (1990) documented that the CEO loses only $3.25 for every $1,000 decline in rm value, an
e¤ective equity stake of 0.3%. Jensen and Murphy also found that dollar-dollarincentives (the dollar
change in CEO wealth for a dollar change in rm value) decline strongly in rm size, a relationship
conrmed by many subsequent studies. It seems not only that incentives are low on average, but they
are particularly weak in the largest rms which are most important for the economy. Bebchuk and
Fried (2004) interpret the negative scaling as evidence that governance is particularly weak in large
rms, allowing managers to negotiate contracts with suboptimally low sensitivities.
By contrast, Haubrichs (1994) seminal calibration showed that Jensen and Murphys ndings need
not be inconsistent with optimal contracting if the CEO is su¢ ciently risk-averse. Edmans, Gabaix
and Landier (forthcoming) attempt to jointly explain both the level of CEO incentives and their
scaling with rm size without requiring risk aversion. They posit that CEO e¤ort has a percentage
(i.e. multiplicative) e¤ect on rm value, because most actions can be rolled outacross the entire
rm, and a percentage e¤ect on CEO utility, so that leisure is a normal good. Therefore, for incentive
compatibility, a rm value increase of 1% should generate a su¢ cient percentage increase in the CEOs
wealth. This required percentage increase equals the marginal cost of e¤ort and does not depend on
rm size. The relevant measure of incentives is thus percent-percent incentives the percentage
change in CEO wealth for a percentage rm return and is size-independent. In turn, dollar-dollar
incentives equal percent-percent incentives multiplied by the CEOs wage and divided by rm size.
This identity can reconcile both of the above facts. First, since rm size is substantially larger than
the CEOs wage, it dollar-dollar incentives are inevitably low, exactly as found by Jensen and Murphy.
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Second, since empirically the wage has a 1=3 elasticity with size4, dollar-dollar incentives should have
a size elasticity of 1=3  1 =  2=3, quantitatively consistent with Edmans et al.s empirical estimate
of -0.60. Simply put, since CEO e¤ort has such a strong e¤ect in a large rm, a small equity stake is
su¢ cient to deter shirking.
While the CEO is risk-neutral in Edmans et al., He (2008a) shows that risk aversion can qual-
itatively explain the negative relationship between incentives and size. The risk imposed by equity
compensation is higher in a larger rm, thus diminishing the optimal equity level. Dickss (2008)
perspective is governance is more productive in large companies. Thus, the optimal level of monitor-
ing is higher in such rms, reducing the need for monetary incentives. Gervais, Heaton and Odean
(2008) show that managerial overcondence can reduce the incentives required to induce a manager
to undertake risky but protable projects. A rational manager may turn down such projects since he
has undiversied rm-specic human capital, but an overcondent manager overvalues such projects
and thus will take them even with relatively low incentives.
An alternative justication of seemingly low incentives is that there are negative consequences of
equity alignment, which an e¢ cient contract must balance. In Benmelech, Kandel and Veronesi (2007),
at some point the CEO privately observes that the rm has matured and its growth potential has
diminished. The optimal action would be to disclose to the market that investment opportunities have
declined, thus allowing him to e¢ ciently reduce the level of investment. However, such a disclosure
will reduce the stock price, and so a manager with a large equity stake may conceal the information
and persist with the (now ine¢ cient) high investment policy.5 In a similar vein, Peng and Roell
(2008) and Goldman and Slezak (2006) demonstrate that high incentives can encourage the manager
to expend rm resources to manipulate the stock price upwards.6 Acharya and Bisin (forthcoming)
show that if a CEO can hedge the component of his equity compensation related to market risk but
not idiosyncratic risk, he will favor projects which bear the former but not the latter. This in turn
leads to excessive aggregate risk in the economy as a whole. As in the other theories, a reduction in
pay-performance sensitivity is optimal to alleviate these perverse incentives.
2.3. Sensitivity to Luck
While CEOs are believed to be insu¢ ciently punished for poor performance of their own rm, which
is likely under their responsibility, an additional concern is that they are rewarded for general market
upswings outside their responsibility, i.e. paid for luck (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). This
practice contradicts theories of compensation that advocate relative performance evaluation, such as
Holmstrom (1982).
4See Gabaix and Landier (2008) for a survey of the empirical evidence.
5Their model provides a theoretical foundation for the agency costs of overvalued equitydiscussed in Jensen (2004).
6Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) show that manipulation may sometimes benet shareholders. In speculative
markets where there are overoptimistic buyers, short-term manipulation allows current shareholders to sell the stock
for a higher price to purchasers who overvalue the stock. Therefore, short vesting periods may be optimal, as observed
empirically.
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There are a number of quite distinct rationalizations of pay-for-luck. Oyer (2004) posits that the
CEOs outside opportunities are more attractive in broader market upswings. An increase in pay is
therefore necessary to persuade him to stay with the rm.
Axelson and Baliga (forthcoming) consider the design of renegotiation-proof long-term contracts.
To prevent interim renegotiation, the manager must have private information that causes him to have
a di¤erent view from the board on the value of his long-term pay. Industry prospects are an example
of such private information, and so it can be e¢ cient to make the contract contingent upon them.
Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2008) argue that the rms exposure to sector movements is an
important aspect of the CEOs strategic choice. Tying the CEO to industry performance induces him
to choose this exposure optimally. Moreover, owing to risk aversion, the optimal contract will reward
the manager for good sector performance but not punish him for bad luck.
Noe and Rebello (2008) jointly model CEO compensation and governance in a dynamic world,
where the board learns rm quality over time. Even if high past performance is unrelated to CEO
e¤ort, it provides information about intrinsic rm quality and thus future cash ow generation poten-
tial. Stronger future prospects in turn raise the managers marginal productivity and thus his optimal
current compensation.
Danthine and Donaldson (2008) adopt a consumption-based equilibrium approach. For CEOs to
maximize value on behalf of shareholders, they must evaluate projects using the same discount rate
as shareholders. By tying pay to aggregate market conditions, the managers consumption stream is
perfectly correlated with shareholders, and so he uses the correct discount rate.
3. The Structure of Pay
3.1. Stock versus Options
While Section 2.2 tackles the slope of incentives, this section addresses their convexity. Most empirical
measures of incentives consider the overall sensitivity of incentives of CEO wealth to rm value, but
do not distinguish between incentives provided by stock as opposed to options. Similarly, theories
based on e¤ort alone derive the optimal contract as a general sensitivity to rm performance, and are
ambivalent as to whether this is implemented using stock or options, i.e. whether contracts should be
linear or convex. However, stock and options di¤er along two dimensions. Since options are riskier,
$1 of options is worth less to the CEO than $1 of stock, rendering them more expensive to the rm.
On the other hand, since $1 of options provides greater incentives than $1 of stock, this tends to make
them cheaper. Dittmann and Maug (2007) calibrate the standard principal-agent model widely used
in contract theory, where the CEO has exponential utility and makes only an e¤ort decision. They
nd that the rst e¤ect is dominant, suggesting that the optimal contract should involve only stock
and not options. Their empirical estimation shows that these predictions are strongly contradicted,
giving rise to a puzzle.
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Bebchuk and Fried (2004) interpret the widespread use of options as rent extraction since at-the-
money options did not have to be expensed until 2006, and so such compensation was only disclosed
in footnotes where they are less visible to investors. However, a number of recent theories show
that options can be rationalized with plausible extensions to the standard principal-agent model.
Motivated by ample psychological evidence and its success in explaining a number of asset pricing
puzzles, Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2008) posit a loss averse utility function. If the CEO has a
low reference wage, options now become part of the optimal contract. Owing to their asymmetric
payo¤ structure, options limit the CEOs downside upon bad luck, and this insurance is particularly
valuable to a loss averse agent. Hence, the optimal contract involves carrots (rewards for high
performance), rather than sticks(punishment for poor performance), and the former are provided
by convex instruments such as options.
Dittmann and Yu (2008) show that observed compensation structures can be rationalized even
with exponential utility, if the CEO chooses rm risk in addition to e¤ort, since options provide
stronger risk-taking incentives. Armstrong, Larcker and Su (2007) nd that options are part of the
optimal contract when jointly endogenizing the target e¤ort level in addition to the contract structure,
with a lower bound on cash salary, and under the assumption that the market does not anticipate the
compensation contract.
If options are indeed e¢ cient, the optimal strike price then becomes an important question. As
mentioned above, the widespread use of at-the-money options may suggest rent extraction; Bebchuk
and Fried (2004) argue that out-of-the-money options should instead be used as they only pay o¤
upon strong performance. Maug and Spalt (2008) calibrate the loss-averse model used by Dittmann,
Maug and Spalt (2008) to justify stock options in the rst instance and nd that, in fact, almost as
many rms should grant in-the-money as out-of-the-money options. Dittmann and Yu (2008) nd
that in-the-money options are optimal under exponential utility if the CEO can a¤ect rm risk. Both
papers nd that the savings from switching from at-the-money options to options with optimal strike
prices are very small, and so current practices are not signicantly suboptimal.
3.2. Severance Pay
Severance pay has been a particularly controversial feature of compensation in the recent nancial
crisis. It is especially prevalent among dismissed CEOs compared to those who voluntarily retire
(Yermack, 2006) and thus appears to reward CEOs for failure. It may therefore further exacerbate
the weak incentives caused by low stock and option awards, as discussed in Section 2.2.
As with many of the other empirical puzzles, severance pay is di¢ cult to rationalize with a standard
principal-agent model where the CEO controls only e¤ort, but can be justied by richer frameworks.
Inderst and Mueller (2008) argue that severance pay can deter a CEO from entrenching himself by
concealing negative information that would lead to his dismissal. Similarly, Almazan and Suarez
(2003) show that, if the CEO is entrenched owing to a weak board, severance pay can encourage him
to retire when a more able replacement is available. On the other hand, if the board is strong, the
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CEO may fail to exert e¤ort with long-lasting consequences since he fears dismissal. Severance pay
may then be optimal for a di¤erent reason: it solves the above time-inconsistency problem by ensuring
that he earns a return on his e¤ort.
Manso (2008) shows that, if an important aspect of the CEOs job is to explore new technologies
rather than merely exploit existing ones, the optimal contract involves reward for failure. He (2008b)
demonstrates that, if the CEO can privately save, he will undo any contract which involves front-loaded
payments by saving high current consumption for the future. A contract robust to private savings
must therefore involve a non-decreasing wage pattern over time. Severance pay achieves this structure
by supporting his post-ring consumption at the current wage level. In Heen (2008), non-compete
agreements reduce a departing CEOs labor market opportunities, and so the optimal contract contains
severance pay as compensation. Heens empirical results support the view that severance pay results
from non-compete agreements, rather than rent extraction.
3.3. Debt
While the majority of compensation research has focused on stock and options, recent empirical
studies (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Gerakos, 2007) have found that
U.S. CEOs hold substantial dened benet pensions. These are unsecured obligations which yield an
equal claim with other creditors in bankruptcy, and thus constitute inside debt.7 Empiricists have also
noted the widespread use of deferred compensation, another form of inside debt, although systematic
studies have so far been limited by data availability.8 Since the vast majority of theories advocate only
equity-like instruments, Bebchuk and Jackson argue that inside debt represents hidden compensation,
particularly since disclosure requirements were limited until recently.
Edmans (2008) justies inside debt as an e¢ cient deterrent to risk-shifting. Previously proposed
remedies include bonuses for achieving solvency, or salaries and private benets that are forfeited in
bankruptcy. These instruments are sensitive to the incidence of bankruptcy, but if bankruptcy occurs,
they pay zero regardless of liquidation value. By contrast, inside debt yields a positive payo¤ in
bankruptcy, proportional to the recovery value. Thus it renders the manager sensitive to rm value
in bankruptcy, and not just the incidence of bankruptcy exactly as desired by creditors. Indeed,
debt-aligned managers reduce rm risk, as measured by the rms distance to default (Sundaram and
Yermack, 2007) or its credit rating (Gerakos, 2007). Inside debt can thus reduce the cost of raising
external debt, to the benet of shareholders.
7Insidedebt refers to debt owned by the manager, rather than external investors.
8Despite limited data, anecdotal evidence suggests that such compensation may be substantial. For example, Roberto
Goizueta, the former CEO of Coca-Cola, had over $1 billion in deferred compensation when he died.
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4. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Pay
4.1. Industry Dynamics
Empirical predictions for the cross-sectional determinants of pay can be generated by embedding
the principal-agent problem into a market equilibrium. Section 2 discussed how incorporating the
competitive labor market yields relationships with rm size. An alternative equilibrium approach is
to analyze the rm within the context of a competitive industry, thus generating comparative statics
for the e¤ect of product market competition.
Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2008) show that incentives are optimally lower among industry leaders,
since they have fewer growth opportunities than laggards and so the benets of e¤ort are smaller.
Moreover, in industries where market share is evenly distributed across rms, competition is particu-
larly erce. This leads to large gains from e¤ort and thus high optimal incentives.
Baranchuk, MacDonald and Yang (2008) introduce product market competition to endogenize rm
size. If industry demand increases, large rms gain disproportionately, increasing the skewness of size
and thus the skewness of pay. A rise in demand also increases the level of through two channels. It
augments prots, which rms compete away to retain managerial talent. It also raises the optimal level
of e¤ort, necessitating higher pay as compensation. Since industry demand is outside the managers
control, the paper o¤ers an additional justication for pay-for-luckto those in Section 2.3.
4.2. What Need Not Matter For Executive Compensation?
While the above subsection addresses parameters that do a¤ect optimal compensation policy, it is
also interesting to understand which factors need not matter. Grossman and Hart (1983) show that,
even in simple settings, the optimal contract is highly complex. It typically cannot be solved for
in closed form and is contingent upon many specic features of the contracting situation, such as
the agents utility function and noise distribution. This dependence presents challenges for real-life
contract designers, such as boards, since the above parameters are di¢ cult for them to measure and
thus use to guide the optimal contract.
Edmans and Gabaix (2008) demonstrate that, in a broad class of situations, these details need not
matter: the contract is detail-neutral.They rst x the target e¤ort level and solve for the cheapest
contract that implements it. The e¢ cient incentive slope is attainable in closed form and independent
of the noise distribution. Moreover, if the cost of e¤ort can be expressed in monetary terms (e.g. it
represents an opportunity cost of working elsewhere), the contract is linear regardless of the CEOs
utility function. The framework thus extends the tractable contracts of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) to settings that do not require exponential utility, Gaussian noise nor continuous time. Next,
they endogenize the target e¤ort level that the principal wishes to implement and shows that it may
also be detail-neutral. In standard models, the e¤ort level results from a trade-o¤ between its positive
e¤ect on rm value and the direct disutility of e¤ort plus the risk imposed by incentives required to
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induce e¤ort. If the rm is su¢ ciently large, the benets of e¤ort (which are proportional to rm size)
swamp the costs (which are proportional to CEO pay), and so maximum e¤ort is always optimal 
the maximum e¤ort principle. Therefore, rm risk and the CEOs risk aversion matter neither for
the optimal e¤ort level nor the e¢ cient contract to implement this e¤ort level. The irrelevance of rm
risk is consistent with the empirical evidence surveyed by Prendergast (2002): a number of studies
nd that incentives are not signicantly related to risk, with the remainder equally divided between
nding positive and negative correlations.
5. Conclusion
A number of features of observed compensation schemes appear to be inconsistent with optimal
contracting, and are thus frequently interpreted as evidence of rent extraction. Such views in turn
lead to calls for policymakers to intervene and regulate executive pay. This article has surveyed a
number of recent theories which reach a di¤erent conclusion. By incorporating complex, but realistic,
aspects of the employment relationship, these above features can be reconciled with e¢ cient pay-
setting.
That an empirical nding is consistent with an optimal contracting model does not rule out the
possibility that it results from rent extraction. Most stylized facts in economics have multiple expla-
nations, and further research is necessary to evaluate the competing hypotheses. In addition, even if
compensation is e¢ cient on average, it does not preclude pay schemes being suboptimal in particular
rms, and so intense scrutiny (by shareholders or boards) remains important. Moreover, there are
a number of puzzles as yet unexplained by optimal contracting theories. Why was backdating of
stock options so prevalent? Why is a signicant proportion of compensation in hidden forms such as
perks? Why does the stock market sometimes react positively to the death of an allegedly optimally
contracted CEO? These are ripe questions for future research. The purpose of this article, and of
the theories it surveys, is not to claim that compensation is denitely e¢ cient, but to highlight the
two-sided nature of the issue and the need for further research to draw clearer conclusions. As with
all interesting debates, we expect this one will continue for some time.
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